The paper presents a comparative analysis of the resource-rich transition economies of Mongolia and the southern republics of the former Soviet Union. For Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the ability to earn revenue from cotton exports allowed them to avoid reform. Oil in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan was associated with large-scale corruption, but with soaring revenues in the 2000s their institutions evolved and to some extent improved. Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia illustrate the challenges facing small economies with large potential mineral resources, with the former suffering from competition for rents among the elite and the latter from lost opportunities. Overall the countries illustrate that a resource curse is not inevitable among transition economies, but a series of hurdles need to be surmounted to benefit from resource abundance. Neither the similar initial institutions nor those created in the 1990s are immutable.
INTRODUCTION
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the termination of the centrally planned economy, the resource wealth of the southern Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and Mongolia was seen as a major advantage for their national economic development. However, all seven countries experienced severe transitional recessions during the 1990s, and even though economic performance improved in the first decade of the 21st century it has been uneven and there are doubts about sustainability. This paper examines the links between resource management and economic performance during the transition from central planning (effectively 1990-2010) .
There is a large literature on the relatively poor performance of resource-rich countries. The recent literature views a resource curse as a conditional relationship, into which some resource-rich countries fall but other resource-rich countries do not, and has focused on two sets of conditioning variables:
poor government spending associated with the volatility of state revenues, and institutional dysfunction, especially when there is competition for control over resource rents.
1 A central question in this paper is whether countries in transition from a centrally planned economy and Communist polity are particularly vulnerable to a resource curse due to their fragile and changing institutions and their inexperience with policymaking in a market-based economy.
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The seven countries provide a rich mine of information because policies have varied across countries over the two decades. To simplify the structure of the paper, the individual countries' experiences are presented in appendix A, while the main text of the paper presents the central arguments and crosscountry evidence. Summary statistics for the seven countries and annual data on foreign direct investment inflows and GDP growth are presented in tables 1 to 3. Production data for oil and gas are in table 4, and world prices for cotton, oil, copper, and gold are shown in figures 1 to 4.
Comparative analysis is complicated by the differing resource bases and evolution of world prices for different primary products. Oil is the principal export of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and was the source 1. The theme is old, but the modern resource curse literature was stimulated by Sachs and Warner (1995) . In the 1980s and 1990s the focus was on Dutch disease effects, but more recent contributions emphasize volatility or institutions. Volatility issues are emphasized in Gelb et al. (1988) , Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth (2002) , Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) , and van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) . Tornell and Lane (1999) modeled the perverse impact of rent-seeking after a resource windfall. Tsalik (2003) , Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) , and Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005) highlighted the deleterious impact of poor institutional quality. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) found that resource abundance is a boon with good (producer-friendly) institutions and a curse with bad rent-grabber-friendly) institutions, while Boschini, Petersson, and Roine (2007) emphasized the interaction between the appropriability of resources and quality of institutions.
2. Esanov, Raiser, and Buiter (2001) argued that resource abundance was particularly harmful in the Soviet successor states because it allowed reform to be postponed and encouraged rent-seeking behavior, but that paper was written before the booms of the 2000s. Brunnschweiler (2009) reached the opposite conclusion that among former Soviet and Eastern European countries in transition, oil had a positive impact on growth between 1990 and 2006. of their rapid growth in 2000-08. Natural gas is more important for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (and is also important for Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) and raises issues of pipelines and long-term contracts.
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Minerals are important across the region, but especially copper for Mongolia and gold for the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. In Central Asia conflict between upstream and downstream countries over water use has energy aspects, especially the development of hydroelectric capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. Water is also a critical input for cotton production, which is a significant export for all Central Asian countries, especially Uzbekistan. Although this paper focuses on energy and mineral resources rather than agricultural production, it is difficult to ignore cotton.
An important economic policy variation is between more dirigiste regimes (e.g., Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan) and more liberal regimes (e.g., the Kyrgyz Republic and Mongolia). This may be endogenous, as the dominant role of cotton in the Uzbek and Turkmen economies at the time of independence contributed to a policy focus on rent appropriation. Cotton required extensive government presence in maintaining irrigation channels and other functions, and this presence spilled over into the maintenance of state marketing monopolies and subsequent squeezing of farmers' margins. Moreover, with buoyant cotton prices in the early and mid-1990s (figure 1), the cotton-exporting countries were able to maintain public expenditure relatively well and were under less pressure to reform their economic and political systems than other countries in transition from central planning.
The economies reliant on energy and mineral resources were under pressure to find foreign investors to help exploit the resources and to be more market-friendly in their policies. In the 2000s oil-exporting Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan reaped the fruits of contracts signed in the 1990s and had to decide how to manage the resource boom. Kazakhstan also appeared to reconsider the terms under which it had allowed foreign investors into its energy sector, raising doubts about the security of long-term contracts and of institutional arrangements. The smaller economies of the Kyrgyz Republic and Mongolia had greater difficulty striking a balance in negotiations with large foreign companies to explore and exploit their mineral (i.e., gold and copper) reserves.
The extensive literature on whether resource abundance is a curse indicates that many resource-rich countries have had poor economic performance, but many others have not. This paper assumes the existence of a potential bounty from resource abundance, but to realize the bounty a country must surmount several hurdles, and each has potential pitfalls:
n The resources need to be found and exploited. For many mineral and energy resources this requires specialized skills, not possessed by domestic companies. Forgoing significant external participation 3. The seven countries are land-locked and transport infrastructure is important, but it is also commodity specific. For both oil and gas, pipelines are the least-cost mode of transport, but for oil, rail (and boat across the Caspian) is a plausible alternative. For gas, pipelines dominate, and construction of a pipeline is associated with long-term supply contracts to restrict opportunistic behavior by the monopoly supplier or the monopsony customer.
can constrain output and lead to missed opportunities (as in Turkmenistan and Mongolia), but attracting competing foreign investors may create institutional problems, such as opportunities for corruption.
n When the resources are sold, revenues need to be divided. Resource rents typically accrue to the state, but individuals may try to capture rents. Excessive competition for rents can lead to a tragedy of the anticommons (i.e., too little output) or to state capture by a narrow elite. In both cases institutional degradation is the result. Recontracting to decrease the share of rents accruing to foreign partners will reduce a country's attractiveness to future foreign investors.
n Once rents have accrued to the state, a sovereign wealth fund may help macropolicy (minimizing Dutch disease effects) or smooth the earnings flow or save for future generations, but politicians may be tempted to raid the fund. Having an easy source of public revenue may be associated with poor public policy and lack of accountability, as the government does not need to seek public approval (e.g., via parliament) for its spending policies. Both the size and composition of current public spending may be inappropriate for long-run economic development.
These challenges will be addressed under three headings: producing resource exports, competing for rents, and using resource revenues.
PRODUCINg ResOURCe exPORTs
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Tarr (1994) estimated which Soviet successor states would benefit most from being able to trade at world prices rather than Soviet prices. The big gainers were energy exporters, including Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia. In fact, energy resources proved less valuable than expected during the transition from central planning, because world energy prices were stagnant between 1992 and 1998 and because oil and gas exports had to use the Russian pipeline network, whose operator charged high transit fees. Turkmenistan's gas was sold to customers on the network under long-run contracts; Ukraine and Azerbaijan did not pay their gas bills, causing Turkmenistan eventually to cut off gas supplies in 1997-99 and suffer loss of GDP.
The big gainers from the shift to world prices after 1992 were cotton exporters. Cotton has a high value/weight ratio and is relatively easy to export by a variety of modes. In addition world prices rose between 1992 and 1996 (figure 1), benefitting especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; cotton production in the third-largest producer, Tajikistan, was disrupted by civil war until 1997. Uzbekistan was the best performing former Soviet republic in the 1990s, but there were pitfalls. Cotton revenues cushioned the transitional recession but also reduced the perceived need for radical reform; Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan remain, with Belarus, the least reformed formerly centrally planned economies. Outcomes in the Uzbek and Turkmen cotton sectors were similar but not identical. Both governments used state marketing to extract rents from cotton and leave farmers' revenues far below world prices, and both provided incentives to shift from cotton to wheat in the name of food security. In Uzbekistan, however, the state played a positive function in maintaining irrigation channels and ensuring input supply so that long-run cotton output remained roughly constant, whereas in Turkmenistan these functions were not performed well. 4 The explanation most likely lies in the initial conditions:
Tashkent was the center of Soviet Central Asia with greater administrative capacity (and the Ministry of Water Resources employed more people than any other ministry in the Uzbek Soviet Republic), but
Turkmenistan lacked such a legacy of competent administration.
Turkmenistan was, however, saved from its economic mismanagement by rising energy prices just when the economy seemed to be in deep trouble at the end of the 1990s. Turkmenistan was the world's fourth largest gas producer in 1991 with fairly modern facilities. Gas production was not much different in 2010, but soaring oil prices increased demand for gas and improved Turkmenistan's bargaining position vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia's Gazprom.
The two major Caspian oil producers, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, needed foreign expertise to exploit their oil and gas reserves. During the final decades of the Soviet Union, attention focused on Siberian oilfields to the neglect of Azerbaijan, which had been the major producing region in the early 1900s. Kazakhstan was not a major oil producer in the Soviet era, but the biggest foreign investment contract in Soviet history happened to be on Kazakhstani territory: the Tengiz oilfield, in which Chevron was the lead producer. Tengiz came online in the 1990s, but the process was delayed by continual maneuvering by the Kazakh leadership to restructure the ownership in return for private payments.
Azerbaijan's oil sector was in a more parlous state, but in the dire economic and political conditions following the war with Armenia, the Azerbaijani leadership was desperate to have oil flowing as soon as possible. The Deal of the Century was signed in 1994 with a BP-led consortium of Western companies to develop a major offshore oilfield.
4. Virtually all crop land in Turkmenistan is irrigated. During the 1990s the budget for maintaining the Karakum Canal, the core of the irrigation system in southern Turkmenistan, fell from $3.2 million to $20,000 and the personnel employed in maintenance fell from 1,700 in 1987 to 640 in 1999; a consequence was increased salinization-a problem that had been avoided in irrigated agriculture in the area since prehistoric times (O'Hara and Hannan 1999 Republic, the initial deal with Cameco, for all its shortcomings, was with a major producer, whereas the more convoluted negotiations in the 2000s over other goldfields have been with companies of lesser standing. 6 The best outcomes are when a government keen to do business makes a deal with a good foreign partner, as Azerbaijan did with BP in the Deal of the Century. However, haste may lead to poor bargaining over distribution of the spoils, to which I will now turn.
shaRINg The ReNTs
Sharing the rents is typically the most controversial part of the process. Host governments are understandably concerned about the extent to which revenue from national resources accrues to foreigners.
Preserving the rents for the host country can, however, lead to a resource curse when the government becomes addicted to the grasping hand (as in the treatment of cotton in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) or when internecine conflict among the elite challenges social cohesion (as in the Kyrgyz Republic).
Mongolia's mining laws and negotiations for development of Oyu Tolgoi were disastrously hampered by a fixation on a 51 percent shareholding. Kazakhstan's resource nationalism in the 2000s involved increased shareholdings for the state-owned energy company KazMunaiGas (KMG) even when it contributed little, creating a poorer national environment for future foreign investment.
In practice, sharing the rents equitably is difficult. Foreign participation is necessary when only foreign firms have the required technical expertise, skilled labor, and financial resources to explore and exploit the resources. These firms need to recoup their costs and make a normal profit as well as self-insure for projects that prove barren. Moreover, there is a time inconsistency problem: The foreign firm becomes 5. The Kashagan PSA was signed in 1997 with Eni as the lead operator. Repeated delays and cost increases have led some of the consortium partners to sell out, while Italian prime ministers Romano Prodi and Silvio Berlusconi have flown to Astana to negotiate terms for maintaining Eni's position (Nurmakov 2010, 29-32) . Relations continued to deteriorate. In November 2010 Kazakhstan's financial police reported that Eni was under investigation for overrepresenting costs at Kashagan, which meant that the company had "avoided taxation and stolen state property" (reported in Financial Times (London), November 20, 2010).
6. This may be changing as the license for exploration of the Aktash/Andash gold and copper deposits was granted in 2010 to the Australian listed company Kentor Gold.
more expendable once production is in train, so the foreign firm will insist on front-loading its share to reduce the costs of possible expropriation. Production sharing agreements (PSAs) are typically structured to reflect this time inconsistency. With asymmetric information and transfer pricing, however, the foreign firm may present the accounts so that cost recovery appears to take longer than in reality. 7 If the state fails to specify environmental or work safety obligations or to hold the partner responsible for other negative externalities, then the partner will not be obligated to spend money on these. Because many energy or mining PSAs cover long-life projects, conditions will change, but the host may be tied to a contract under which changes can be challenged under arbitration that focuses on the narrow contractual arrangements without concern for social or other politically sensitive matters; ignoring an arbitration decision risks serious loss of future foreign investment.
Sharing the rents is controversial because changing the shares is perceived to be a zero-sum game, but there are long-term implications. The host nation should leave the foreign firm with a reasonable return on its physical and knowledge capital, recognizing that investment in natural resources is a risky business. If the government pushes too hard, as in Mongolia, there will be no resource exploitation. PSAs worked better in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan than in the Kyrgyz Republic because the size of the oil price increase after 1998 led to massive windfall gains to the host countries whether or not they had managed to maximize their share of the rents. Nevertheless, after about half a decade, the governments of both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan tried to shift the shares in their favor by increasing the national oil companies' participation, with some success but at the risk of discouraging future foreign investment.
If domestic companies are part of the exploiting consortium, then more revenues accrue domestically. The trade-off is that the domestic energy or mining companies often do not have anything to contribute to the consortium; absence of technology and skills is usually the principal reason for involving foreign companies. Moreover, state energy companies have often been highly politicized.
The possibility that the rents may be siphoned off in the negotiating stage or through a nontransparent state entity or in Turkmenbashi's case simply placed into off-budget accounts under presidential control highlights the potential for rent seeking rather than productive behavior, and hence institutional degradation.
The rent-sharing stage leads to a resource curse when governments and elites become addicted to grasping hand strategies, which lead to internecine conflicts among the elite. The former appeared to be a danger in Kazakhstan in the 1990s but seems to have been averted in the 2000s largely due to the 7. In Pomfret (2011) I provide more details on the PSAs signed by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Disputes with Eni, lead operator of Kazakhstan's Kashagan oilfield, centered on whether the foreign company was overstating costs and hence postponing the date when revenues would flow into Kazakhstan's public purse.
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personality of the president. Internecine conflicts among the elite have been most apparent in the Kyrgyz
Republic, but succession crises could be a catalyst in the autocratic countries.
UsINg ResOURCe ReveNUes
Once resources are being exploited governments face the question of how to use the revenues. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were able to generate large revenues during the 1998-2008 oil boom because they had involved foreign companies in exploration and exploitation of energy resources. As oil prices began to rise after 1998 and then soared after 2003, revenues far exceeded domestic absorption capacity, and both countries created sovereign wealth funds to manage the windfall. In both countries it is early to assess how well the revenues are being used. Azerbaijan's heavy current spending looks more risky, especially as its oil reserves have a relatively short projected life. Surges in social spending may be associated with diminishing returns and waste; Esanov (2009) finds diminishing efficiency of expenditures as spending on health, education, and social policy increased in resource-rich former Soviet republics. Kazakhstan has placed more emphasis on diversification of the economy and on human capital formation, but in the 2008-09 stimulus package withdrawals from the NFRK supported 8. Kalyuzhnova and Kaser (2006) and Kalyuzhnova (2006 Kalyuzhnova ( , 2008 provide assessments of the oil funds of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov (2009) Reliance on resource revenues rather than taxes reduces the need for governments to seek popular support for spending, fostering undemocratic systems and lack of checks on executive power. This is most clearly apparent in Turkmenistan where the country's large cotton and gas rents were largely spent on prestige projects in support of a personality cult or disappeared into foreign bank accounts. Populist measures to provide free or low-cost basic needs were provided at the government's pleasure, and residents had virtually no property rights (e.g., if the government chose to bulldoze their houses to make way for a new statue) or security of supply of power, heating, or plumbed water. In the absence of financial markets or real opportunity cost prices, the limited attempts at increasing productive capacity or diversification of the economy were grossly inefficient; textile mills and clothing factories to process Turkmen cotton had negative value-added at world prices (Pomfret 2006, 94-95) .
Economic management has been better in Uzbekistan, but resource rent addiction fed an autocratic regime. This contributed to the disastrous decision to strengthen foreign exchange controls in 1996 and the difficulty that the government had in unraveling the system based on economic controls rather than on individual decisions taken in a market framework. Uzbekistan's economy has enjoyed fairly steady growth but has fallen behind its neighbors, especially Kazakhstan in living standards and the Kyrgyz Republic in economic freedoms. The main shopping centers for Uzbeks are the massive markets in Bishkek (Dordoi) and near Osh (Kara-su), the two largest cities in the Kyrgyz Republic (Mitra, Kaminski, and Kholmatov 2009) . Migration in search of work in Kazakhstan and Russia and semi-legal cross-border shopping in the Kyrgyz Republic have negative social and institutional consequences, whose ultimate causes are lackluster economic performance and lack of economic freedom.
In contrast to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where strong rulers have managed to ensure centralized control over rents, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic have had messier outcomes. In Tajikistan the first decade after independence was dominated by civil war. A major prize for the victor, who established the autocratic regime of the 21st century, is control over the revenues from the hydroelectric-aluminum complex, which accounts for the largest share of the country's export earnings.
9. In an earlier study, Luecke and Trofimenko (2008) found some evidence of redistribution by the state, although they cautioned that this may have been no more than compensation to internally displaced people due to the conflict with Armenia.
The Kyrgyz Republic had the least autocratic president in Central Asia, and he introduced the most liberal economic regime in the region. Nevertheless, corruption remained pervasive, including allegations against members of the presidential family and concerns over why the country appeared to benefit little from its gold exports. President Askar Akayev was overthrown in the peaceful 2005 tulip revolution, but hopes for a better functioning democracy were dashed when his successor turned out to be, if anything, more corrupt. President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was overthrown in April 2010. The country remains poor with ethnic divisions that erupted in June 2010 but also has the greatest freedom and least repressive government in Central Asia. Early signs as it attempts to establish a parliamentary democracy are that competition over resource rents has shifted from the presidential palace to parliament, and the challenge will be to forge a political system in which governments are held accountable for public spending.
An alternative to channeling resource rents into the state budget or sovereign wealth fund is to redistribute resource rents to the population, who can make private spending decisions, including voting on how much to devote to public expenditures through taxes. In Mongolia both major parties have promised cash handouts to the people, but doing this before earning substantial resource revenues looks like fiscal profligacy. In general, success in both attracting investment and managing resource rents in ways that produce a resource boon rather than a resource curse depends upon good governance and transparency.
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CONClUsIONs
Governments of resource-rich countries must decide how and how fast to exploit their natural resources, how to share the revenues between companies and the state, and how to use the state's revenues. These are interconnected. If the "how" is unacceptable to any company with the technology to exploit the resource, then the other questions are irrelevant. If the terms are too attractive to a private-sector partner, then the country may achieve rapid exploitation but not have revenues to spend. Moreover, this is not a one-shot game: Either side may try to recontract, leaving the other to accept, renegotiate, or give up on the deal.
In a bilateral monopoly situation, the government may win a battle over division of the spoils but deter future investors concerned about the credibility of government commitments.
Resources are not destiny. There are choices to be made that determine whether resources are a boon or a curse. Initial policy choices may lead to adverse institutional developments, but these institutions in turn may be changed. Failing to take advantage of resource abundance may be a missed opportunity, because the value of resources in the ground is constantly changing and what is valuable today may be obsolete in the future. Resource exploitation is, however, only the first step towards a resource boon. Failure to pursue good policies can often produce a resource curse, as the cross-country evidence shows. The formerly centrally planned economies may be especially prone to such an outcome due to their inexperience with policymaking in market-based economies and the absence of strong economic institutions, but the malleability of institutions can also be an advantage as adverse institutional consequences of initial decisions can be corrected.
None of the seven countries covered in this paper suffers yet from a full-blown irreversible resource curse, but the main potential source of a resource curse is institutional degradation. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan all have autocratic regimes based on rent extraction rather than on wealth creation. This has been especially harmful for Turkmenistan because the country's first president wasted much of the rents on personal aggrandizement. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan share some of these features, but the governments have attracted foreign investors and increased their countries' productive capacity.
In the Kyrgyz Republic, resource abundance may have contributed to a culture of corruption and rent seeking among the elite, but in early 2011 the Kyrgyz Republic has the most open and democratic political and economic system in Central Asia, albeit with elements of instability.
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Earnings volatility has been less of a resource curse source, despite the massive surge in oil prices.
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan both created sovereign wealth funds in which windfall gains were deposited.
Their differing approaches had costs and benefits: Azerbaijan saved less and the massive increase in current public-sector spending was associated with inefficiencies, while Kazakhstan saved more but ultimately had to use some of the savings to deal with private-sector inefficiencies. Yet, neither country has suffered permanent damage to the public finances, and the real sector has benefited from expenditures financed by 11. The Kyrgyz outcome may be due to chance. Political developments in the closing years of the Soviet era led to discrediting of the Communist leadership, and Mikhail Gorbachev appointed a relative outsider to the post of first secretary of the Soviet republic. As elsewhere, the first secretary became president of the new independent state. President Akayev was more open to advice from Western economists and willing to adopt more liberal policies than his neighbors (e.g., the Kyrgyz Republic was the first Soviet successor state to join the World Trade Organization). Reforms did not have immediate positive outcomes and slowed down in the late 1990s, but the economy and media remained open.
13
the funds. Volatility may have been more damaging to Uzbekistan, insofar as the government's hasty and disastrous response to the downturn in cotton prices in 1996 blighted future economic policymaking.
In contrast to the varying experiences of the former southern Soviet republics, Mongolia had a major failure of public policy in not benefiting from its abundant mineral resources during the two decades after reforms began. The presence of minerals in the Gobi Desert was well-known even if precise locations were not, but a poor policy environment failed to encourage sufficient exploration-and without that there could be no exploitation. Consequently Mongolia missed out on the resource boom of the first decade of the 21st century. It was not a resource curse outcome but a missed opportunity.
Mongolia could be looking forward to a resource boom in the 2010s.
14 aPPeNDIx a COUNTRy exPeRIeNCes
In the early 1900s Azerbaijan produced half of the world's oil, but output stagnated in the second half of the 20th century as Soviet oil investment focused on Siberia. 12 After independence, war with Armenia in 1992-93 over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh further disrupted production, which by 1994 only just covered domestic demand. 13 Military failure contributed to the overthrow of the Popular Front government and election of Heydar Aliyev as president in October 1993. Aliyev negotiated a ceasefire in May 1994 and moved to kick-start the economy by speedy increase in oil production.
Two state oil companies were merged to create the state energy company SOCAR, which has signed 25 production sharing agreements (PSAs) with consortia of foreign oil companies, including the Deal of the Century. The deal was signed in September 1994 with a consortium of eight foreign oil companies led by BP, which committed to invest $7.4 billion in offshore oilfields over 30 years. Starting in 1997 oil production began to increase rapidly (table 4) The involvement of foreign companies was crucial in overcoming opposition to the development of Azerbaijan's oil industry in the 1990s from Russia, which controlled the main pipelines, and from Iran, which disputed the demarcation of the South Caspian Sea. Coherence was given by the dominant position of BP, which took the lead in organizing the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline when oil prices began to rise.
Azerbaijan was able to increase oil production faster than Kazakhstan in 1997-99, and oil now accounts for about half of GDP, but with more limited reserves Azerbaijan's life as a major oil producer will be shorter than Kazakhstan's.
In January 2003 SOCAR's charter was revised so that the company retains ownership over oil it produces (previously it relinquished ownership once the oil went to be processed). SOCAR operates about 40 older oilfields, which are generally high-cost due to depletion and aging equipment, and SOCAR's payroll of 50,000 to 70,000 employees is considered bloated. However, with increasing output of oil and Since 1997 there has been concern in Kazakhstan that PSAs gave too much to foreign partners at the expense of Kazakhstan. When such concerns were explained by the inexperience of Kazakh lawyers in the early postindependence years, foreign investors feared that this was a prelude to rewriting contracts and protested strongly; in response President Nazarbayev guaranteed that no existing PSAs would be amended without consensus. In 1999, amendments to the Oil and Gas Law strengthened local content requirements, and subsequent PSAs specified local sourcing. There has been a growing tendency to favor domestic partners, and the 2005 PSA Law mandated a minimum 50 percent participation of KazMunaiGas (KMG).
KMG was created in 2002 by merging state corporations with a variety of oil and gas operations to form a 100 percent state-owned vertically integrated company. KMG's operations include exploration and production, transportation, oil refining, petrochemicals, and marketing of oil and gas, as well as being the government's negotiating arm in PSA contracts. The company is required to supply subsidized fuel to domestic markets and to provide some social services, reflecting its close connection to government and role in policy implementation. KMG's role also includes increasing rent extraction for the government. In this aggressive intent KMG has some resemblance to Russian state-owned energy companies, Gazprom and Rosneft, although unlike the latter KMG has generally acquired larger shares of energy projects in a straightforward and transparent manner by purchase or the transfer of state-held licenses. 15 By 2009 KMG owned about 30 percent of oil production and 40 percent of proven reserves in Kazakhstan. Rather than being an instrument for crude resource nationalism, KMG is being promoted by the government as a national champion that will become a major international company in the mold of Statoil or China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). 14. In contrast to Azerbaijan, whose main PSAs have been published, Kazakhstan's remain secret, although according to Muttitt (2007) the terms are known to all major oil producers.
15. However, the use of environmental regulations to push out PetroKazakhstan's Canadian owner was reminiscent of Russian policy in Sakhalin. The disposal of MMG had echoes of the Yukos affair (see below). Karachaganak is the only major energy project in which KMG does not have a share; a government threat to halt production if increased export duties are not paid (putting pressure on the existing partners to give a share to KMG) is under arbitration.
16. See Olcott (2007) , Kennedy and Nurmakov (2010) and Domjan and Stone (2010 with China on joint uranium production and a joint venture to develop a major copper project.
When prices exceed reference prices, extra revenues from oil, gas, copper, lead, zinc, and chrome are transferred to the National Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK), which was established in 2000.
The NFRK must keep at least a fifth of its assets in the stabilization portfolio, which has specific criteria requiring investment in liquid foreign financial instruments. During the 2003-07 boom, when oil prices rose far above the reference price of $19, Kazakhstan showed prudence in depositing most of the windfall in the NFRK.
17. Legislation tightened the definition of which development costs are covered by PSAs. The government introduced a rent tax on oil exports in 2004 and increased royalty payments on oil and gas in 2005. In 2009 royalties were replaced by a natural resources extraction tax as part of a major tax reform aimed at easing the burden on small and medium-sized enterprises and on the nonextractive sector while increasing revenues from extractive industries.
18. The MMG case was complicated by the involvement in MMG of the president's son-in-law, who was under investigation for criminal activities. Domjan and Stone (2010) liken the case to that of Yukos in Russia, where a previously powerful oligarch was displaced after falling out of political favor, but the MMG takeover was conducted by a more accepted legal process and did not result in a simple state takeover.
The private sector showed no such prudence. The high growth was associated with foreign borrowing based on a strong country credit rating. Banks borrowed abroad and lent domestically, fueling a real estate bubble. Foreign debt, which had been zero at independence, amounted to over Kazakhstan's debt/GDP ratio exceeded 100 percent. Esanov and Kuralbayeva (2010) refer to this combination of public prudence and private profligacy as the Ricardian curse of the oil boom. The public prudence meant that Kazakhstan was able to weather a serious domestic financial crisis by calling on the liquid assets held by the NFRK. However, holding liquid foreign assets that would be used to bail out banks that had overcommitted in the housing bubble was surely not the best use of resources from a national perspective. The government did attempt to use the windfall revenues to diversify agriculture, promote clusters of manufacturing activity, and invest in human capital, but given the country's endowment it could have used oil revenues to an even greater extent to promote future productive capacity rather than supporting construction in the main cities.
The unrestrained private sector boom and bust is also having implications for the structure of ownership in the Kazakhstan economy. KMG is becoming an increasingly important player in the energy sector but the larger issue is the role of Samruk-Kazyna, the National Welfare Fund.The state is the sole shareholder of Samruk-Kazyna, which was created in October 2008 with the merger of two funds, Samruk and Kazyna. Samruk-Kazyna owns, either in whole or in part, over 400 companies, including KMG, the state uranium company, Air Astana, the national rail and postal service, and numerous Turkmenistan, the other major energy producer, was less eager to negotiate contracts with foreign energy companies. At independence the resource base was cotton and a recently developed natural gas sector, neither of which was in urgent need of foreign expertise. President Niyazov (or Turkmenbashi the Great as he preferred to be known) used resource rents to fund populist polices and grandiose buildings. Cotton provided the revenues in the mid-1990s, but the government offered little incentive to farmers and production was falling. As rents from cotton exports declined, revenues from gas exports began to increase after 2000, largely due to external price changes; the volume of gas produced was lower in the 2000s than it had been in 1990 (table 4) .
Gas exports went to or through Russia to markets in the former Soviet Union, primarily Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Payment was partly by barter and bills were often not paid, to the extent that in 1997-99 Turkmenistan resorted to the extreme step of cutting off supplies to Ukraine (reflected in gas output, table 4, and in the fall in GDP in 1997, table 3). As energy prices increased after 1998, Turkmenistan's bargaining position strengthened and the payment terms gradually improved after 2003 (Pomfret, forthcoming) . In Turkmenbashi's final year, 2006, and under his successor, Gurbanguly
Berdymukhamedov, there were signs that the government was concerned about increasing gas output and negotiating a better price. A deal with China included construction of a gas pipeline through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to western China, which was completed in 2009, breaking Russia's quasi-monopoly.
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In sum, Turkmenistan has been successful in recent years in increasing and diversifying its gas exports;
exports to China will be 4.5 to 5.0 bcm in 2010, reaching 40 bcm by 2013 and gas exports to Iran will increase from 8 bcm to 20 bcm. Although Turkmenistan was vulnerable to disruption of exports to Russia between April and December 2009, this dependence will be less problematic in future.
At independence oil output was small, but onshore and offshore reserves in western Turkmenistan were believed to be substantial. Large Western firms were encouraged by PSAs in the 1990s, but after 22. Kalyuzhnova (2008, 83-86) emphasizes lack of technical skills after the departure of Soviet specialists as the cause of falling revenues per cubic meter of gas exports (e.g., due to poorly maintained pipelines). She also highlights how much time in exploring offshore oil reserves (as of 2007) had been wasted due to lack of technical expertise.
23. The Turkmen government was annoyed that it had not been involved in the negotiations and in 2008 refused to issue visas to Eni personnel. The bad blood reportedly also reflected information-sharing between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with Kazakhstan expressing disappointment with Eni's performance as lead operator of Kashagan.
24. Itera originated as a US-registered company (International Trading Energy and Resources Association), whose founder and main shareholder, Igor Makarov, was a Turkmenistan citizen with good connections in Ukraine and Turkmenistan. In 2000 Itera held the contract for selling Turkmenistan gas; despite owning the pipeline, Gazprom allowed Itera to handle the sales and bought about a third of Turkmenistan's exports from Itera at a much higher price, $45 per 1,000 m 3 , than Itera paid Turkmenistan ($35.37 per 1,000 m Uzbekistan has also been reluctant to involve foreign firms in its resource sectors. Given that it has the largest population and second largest GDP of the countries covered in this paper, the foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have been modest (table 2) . Kalotay (2010, 63) reports that FDI into Uzbekistan between 1992 and 2009 accounted for less than 5 percent of gross fixed capital formation, the lowest of any of the Eastern European and former Soviet Union transition economies.
The Uzbekistan economy is better managed than that of Turkmenistan, and buoyed by rising world cotton prices in 1992-96 Uzbekistan had the shallowest transitional recession of any former Soviet republic. Cotton remains a major export. Uzbekistan's second largest export is gold, in the production of which foreign partners have played a role, but the arrangements and gold output are not publicized by the government. Although Uzbekistan is a large producer of natural gas and minor producer of oil, this meets domestic demand and Uzbekistan is roughly self-sufficient in energy. The economy has continued to grow, but the rate of growth since the late 1990s has lagged that of other Central Asian countries.
Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet republics. Independence was accompanied by a civil war, which was not settled until 1997, and the government's hold over parts of the country remains tenuous.
Tajikistan was a major cotton producer in the Soviet era, but the sector has declined since independence.
The country also has substantial hydroelectric potential, which has yet to be realized, despite recurrent reports of Russian FDI. The main use of existing hydro-power is in a Soviet-era aluminum smelter, which is by far the country's largest industrial facility. Although many of the country's resource-related issues are similar to those covered here, Tajikistan does not feature much in this paper because its main challenge continues to be the construction of a functioning state and post-Soviet economy.
The Kyrgyz Republic shares some of Tajikistan's characteristics-a poor mountainous country whose hydroelectricity development is stymied by opposition from downstream neighbors-but it has been more successful in nation-building. The Kyrgyz economy is the most liberal in Central Asia, although it does not function as well as a market economy should because institutional development is flawed and corruption remains a major feature. Uniquely in Central Asia, two presidents have been replaced by popular uprisings and in 2010 a constitution limiting presidential power and promising a parliamentary democracy was adopted. Kumtor, the eighth largest goldmine in the world, accounted for about a sixth former deputy prime minister of Turkmenistan and others were believed to include high-ranking Gazprom managers. After Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia and the Gazprom senior management was revamped in 2001-02, Itera lost the contract. In February 2004, Makarov and the governor of Saint Petersburg, led a high-level delegation to Turkmenistan and signed a PSA for the Zarit consortium (in which Rosneft and Itera each held 37 percent shares) to develop an offshore oil and gas field. The PSA was not finalized due to concerns over territorial disputes with Iran, but in March 2007 Zarit met with President Berdymukhamedov to discuss offshore oil and gas development, and in April 2008 Zarit signed PSAs to develop three offshore blocks.
of the Kyrgyz Republic's GDP in the early 2000s and dominated the country's exports; when the mine's production was disrupted in 2002, GDP growth dropped to zero.
Kumtor was considered commercially nonviable by Soviet geologists, but in 1992 a Canadian company, Cameco, offered to take managerial control of the mine, which would be structured as a joint venture, two-thirds owned by the Kyrgyz government and one-third by Cameco. The arrangement was a PSA with initial revenues accruing to Cameco until it had recouped its upfront costs, but negotiation details were nontransparent. The mine started operation in 1997 and by the end of 2006 had produced more than 5.8 million ounces of gold. The mine was controversial, in part because despite its substantial contribution to GDP it appeared to contribute little to public revenues. Protests about environmental damage (e.g., an incident in 1998 when a truck carrying 1,762 kilograms of sodium cyanide fell into a river on the way to Kumtor) and mine safety (e.g., a 2002 death when part of the mine collapsed) were inflamed in 2005 when it turned out that compensation paid by the company to people suffering from the 1998 incident had ended up in the pocket of a senior official (Ababakirov 2008) .
In 2004 Cameco and the state gold agency restructured the joint venture as Centerra Gold. The Kyrgyz share was reduced from 66 to 30 percent in return for larger payments into the state budget.
The government subsequently sold half of its share to raise money for public expenditure on social projects. Concerns about the actual destination of these revenues contributed to the public unrest, which Mongolia's largest enterprise, the Erdenet copper and molybdenum complex in the mid-north, was established with Soviet aid in 1978 and expanded in several stages, the last in 1987. Thus, Mongolia had a reasonably modern facility at the end of the Soviet era, but since independence that complex has been in decline. 25 Domestic coal production met most of the energy requirements of the main towns and industrial and mining sites. Gold was also produced in many small-scale operations. The Mardai mine, which operated under a 1981 concession to produce uranium for Soviet nuclear warheads, was staffed by
Russians and was so secret that it did not appear on maps. In 1990-92 many Soviet technicians departed.
Although Mongolia was believed to contain unexploited mineral resources, little exploration took place during the 1990s. Democracy in Mongolia has been associated with alternation of governments and large swings in economic policy from freewheeling but corrupt capitalism to a more dirigiste approach, neither of which encouraged the long-term capital inflows necessary to fund copper or coal mines. Development of the Mardai uranium mine by a Canadian-Russian joint venture was dogged by mutual recriminations as the Canadians complained about government delays in issuing a mining lease and an arbitrary windfall profits tax, Russian workers complained about delayed pay and the Russian partner complained that Mongolian workers stripped the town's assets; the Canadian partner pulled out in 1998 after investing $6 million. During the commodity boom of the 2000s, Mongolia passed laws placing punitive taxes on foreign companies. 26 The aim was to ensure that the state gained a large share of Mongolia's mineral wealth, but the effect was to deter investors. 
